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Abstract:  This study examines the role of dualisms in Pareto’s 
theoretical approach to economic and social equilibrium, with 
particular reference to the shift in his treatment of broad social 
phenomena as an aspect of applied economics to the subject of 
general social theory.  It is suggested that dualisms associated with 
Pareto’s recognition of ongoing interaction between subjective and 
objective social phenomena (or endogenous preferences in modern 
parlance) enabled the inductive-deductive-inductive sequence, 
utilised in the 1900 “Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un nuovo trattato di 
economia pura”, to provide the foundation for sound general social 
theory in circumstances where theory deduced from a hypothetical 
postulate fails to derive results that accord with observed fact.  One 
consequence of this new approach is an increased emphasis on the 
relativistic limits of social science and the study of welfare. 
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1) Introduction 
It is now well appreciated that general interdependence is the fundamental and 
unifying aspect of Vilfredo Pareto’s economic and sociological theories of 
equilibrium.  However, the significant role of dualistic distinctions in the development 
of these theories is not well appreciated.  Of course the secondary and historical 
literature has considered some of Pareto’s important dual concepts, including the 
distinctions between ophelimity and utility, elite and non-elite elements of society and 
logical and non-logical conduct.  However, the focus has, by-and-large, centred on 
the meaning and relevance of specific bi-lateral concepts, not the relevance of 
dualistic distinction to the overall development of Pareto’s economic and social 
theory of equilibrium. 
                                                 
*  The paper was initially prepared when the author was a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Research 
into International Competitiveness, Curtin University of Technology.  The initial draft has since been 
revised in light of comments received from participants at: (i) the 2002 Conference of the History of 
Economic Thought Society of Australia (convened between 16 and 19 July at the University of New 
England, Armidale); and (ii) a 2003 seminar presented to the Economics Department of the University 
of Turin (convened 25 February 2003 at the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi).  While retaining responsibility 
for any errors, the author would like to thank participants at the above mention fora for their comments, 
especially Fiorenzo Mornati and Roberto Marchionatti, and Paul Koshy for comments provided out of 
session.  2
Review of specific dualistic distinctions in isolation will reveal little of their 
significance in shaping Pareto’s intellectual contribution.   For example, many 
(although not all) of Pareto’s dualisms are conventional terms and a casual reader’s 
initial response to conventional bi-lateral distinctions, such as the notions of concrete 
and  abstract or deduction and induction, may well be to conclude that the 
methodological context of Pareto’s equilibrium analysis largely conforms with that of 
his peers.   However, a reading of Pareto which identifies the multiplicity of Pareto’s 
conventional and unconventional dualisms, and their relationship with other sets of 
dualisms, reveals a different story: one where bi-lateral distinctions are important in 
the development of Pareto’s most original contributions to equilibrium theory and the 
methodological context within which such theory developed. The thesis of this study 
is that ongoing and increasing use of dualistic distinctions helped facilitate Pareto’s 
shift in the treatment of social equilibrium from an aspect of applied economics to the 
subject of general social theory, and that this shift correlated with the explicit 
recognition and endorsement of a relativistic approach to science.  A secondary goal 
is to indicate when dualistic distinctions serve the purpose of suggesting a balance 
between bilateral concepts and/or phenomena.  
Section 2 outlines the context of this study.  It identifies the three key dualistic 
distinctions in Pareto’s methodology that enabled social phenomena to be treated 
within a general theoretical framework (namely the relationships between fact and 
theory, subjective and objective phenomena and the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
theory).  It also outlines the hypotheses of this study.  Section 3 explores the 
fact-theory dualism, and associated dualisms, in enough detail to establish the scope 
of pure and applied economics in the period up to and including the 1896-97 Cours 
d’économie politique, and the subsequent re-casting of general equilibrium theory in 
the 1900 “Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un nuovo trattato di economia pura del Prof 
Pareto”, suggesting that this constituted the first step towards a modification in 
methodology which would ultimately accommodate the treatment of social 
equilibrium within a generalised theoretical framework.  Section 4 examines the 
remaining methodological developments that finally accommodated social 
phenomena within a general theory of social equilibrium.  Particular emphasis is 
placed on the role of subjective-objective and intrinsic-extrinsic dualisms and the 
explicit endorsement of a relativistic approach to scientific theory.  Section 5 further 
considers Pareto’s relativistic approach to science by focusing on constraints 
associated with the aspect of utility.  The use of dualistic distinctions in the 
development of a general theory of social equilibrium, especially in regard to the 
classification of theoretic elements and illustration of the relevance of theoretical 
elements, is examined in Section 6, as is the use of dualisms as a means of illustrating 
a balance between social forces.  The paper concludes in Section 7 by finding that 
Pareto’s unique and original contributions to equilibrium theory were generally 
facilitated by has capacity to employ successive dualisms.  Even Pareto’s mode of 
thinking on economic and social matters appears to have been characterised by 
successive and varied dualistic contrasts. 
2) Contextual Information 
While Pareto used dualistic distinctions to develop theoretical instruments, their 
significance was also important for the development of his scientific methodology.  In 
its mature form, Pareto’s methodology is based on three fundamental dualisms: the  3
specification of science in terms of a relationship between facts and theories; the 
specification of social phenomena in terms of two interdependent forms, the objective 
and subjective; and the need to investigate both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
theories, where the intrinsic  concerns the soundness of theory in terms of its 
relationship to facts and the extrinsic concerns the relationship between a theory and 
society collectively without regard to the theory’s intrinsic merit. 
Of these dualisms, only the relationship between facts and theories spans the period 
from the 1894 “Prelezione al corso di economia politica”
 1 (Pareto [1894] 1980) to the 
1920 Fatti e teorie (Pareto [1920] 1980).
 2  The remaining two emerged progressively 
as Pareto gave increasing consideration to theoretical sociology.  While the objective 
and  subjective aspects of phenomena are considered in the Cours d’économie 
politique (Pareto [1896-97] 1971), the need to examine the ongoing interdependence 
between the objective and subjective forms was effectively suppressed from pure 
theory to facilitate analytical deduction, and did not re-emerge for investigation until 
the 1900 “Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche” (Pareto [1900] 1980).  Similarly, 
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of theory emerged over many 
years, although the importance of this dualism to the construction of a general theory 
of social equilibrium was not established until the Trattato di sociologia generale 
(Pareto [1916] 1935).   
This study considers the above, and related, dualisms to test the hypotheses that: (i) 
Pareto initially made use of dualistic distinctions to define the legitimate scientific 
limits of a pure theory of economic equilibrium that is deduced from a hypothetical 
postulate, and to define its relationship to applied economics; and (ii) he then 
proceeded to make increasing use of dualisms over the rest of his academic career as 
part of his attempt to develop a general theory of social equilibrium which was not  
deduced from a hypothetical postulate, but developed from an inductive-deductive-
inductive methodological sequence.  This study also demonstrates that dualisms 
played a critical role in facilitating the methodological change necessary for the 
treatment of social equilibrium to shift from applied economics to general and 
relativistic theoretical sociology, classifying many of the various elements of social 
equilibrium theory and illustrating the relevance of these theoretical elements for an 
understanding of society. 
3)  Fact-Theory and Economic Equilibrium 
The basic fact-theory dualism was initially introduced by Pareto to emphasises that 
one element of the dualism is the independent point of reference (facts) for the other 
(theories).  While this view was subsequently modified by the recognition that 
theories may also influence conduct or fact (as discussed in Section 4), Pareto 
consistently presented social laws or theories as general uniformities derived from 
observed facts.  He also consistently attributed this view to the natural sciences, as 
noted in his jubilee speech to the University of Lausanne: 
                                                 
1  “First Lesson of the Course in Political Economy”, originally published in the Gazette de Lausanne 
under the title “Discours de M. Vilfredo Pareto”. 
2 The relationship between facts and theories is actually implied much earlier that 1894, such as in 
“Della Logica delle Nuove Scuole Economiche” (Pareto [1877] 1980) and is further expounded even 
later than 1920, such as in “Previsione dei Fenomeni Sociali” (Pareto [1922] 1980).  4
“The principal purpose of my studies has always been to apply to the 
social sciences – of which the economic sciences are only a part – the 
experimental method that has given such brilliant results in the natural 
sciences” (Pareto [1917] 1980, p.688). 
To achieve this goal in economics, Pareto initially developed a methodological 
framework that accommodated pure theory deduced from the hedonistic postulate.  
The schema to accommodate this was based on a number of conventional dualistic 
distinctions, namely the analysis-synthesis distinction and the concrete-abstract 
distinction.   In the “Prelezione al corso di economia politica”, analysis considers facts 
related to isolated phenomenon while concrete phenomenon is the subject of a 
synthetic re-unification based on analyses of the isolated social phenomena that 
comprise the concrete phenomenon.  However, it was not until the Cours d’économie 
politique (Pareto [1896-97] 1971) that a distinctly Paretian methodological aspect 
emerged, where the dualistic distinctions between theory and practice and between 
the general and particular points of view were employed to introduce a fundamental 
distinction between the primary and secondary characteristics of facts. 
“If we wish to consider a concrete fact, all … sciences must be taken into 
account because they have been separated through a process of 
abstraction… practice differs from the theory because practice must take 
into account a number of secondary characteristics.    The relative 
importance of primary and secondary characteristics is not the same from 
the general point of view of science and from the particular point of view 
of a practical operation.” (Pareto [1896-97] 1971, p.646) 
In short, Pareto differentiated between types of facts, where facts that related to 
primary phenomena were regarded as fundamentally important and facts that related 
to  secondary phenomena were considered of secondary importance.  ‘Concrete’ 
phenomena are deconstructed through abstraction to various ‘primary’ phenomena 
that are the subject of study in specific disciplines within the social sciences.  The 
primary phenomena of different disciplines are interrelated and the same facts may be 
interpreted from a different theoretical perspective, depending on the particular 
principal phenomena under investigation.  Synthesis within disciplines (pure and 
applied studies) and between disciplines is required for principal phenomena to be 
reconstructed into the concrete phenomenon.
3  Pareto refers to this as successive 
approximations (Pareto [1896-97] 1971, p.140), which he continued to endorse 
through to the Trattato di sociologia generale (Pareto [1916] 1935, p.37). 
Importantly, only primary phenomena are subject to the general perspective of 
science.  Pareto specified in the Cours that economic equilibrium is the primary 
phenomena of economics, resulting in a division between a highly constrained pure 
economics and a very broad applied economics that is currently not well appreciated.   
While Pareto’s pure economics examines the properties of general economic 
equilibrium, it does not consider the transition to equilibrium.  Instead, the transition 
to equilibrium is classed as a secondary economic phenomenon and, as such, is 
indirectly dealt with in applied economics.  Pure theory is simply concerned with the 
state of economic equilibrium, and the extent to which theoretical equilibrium accords 
                                                 
3 Guala (1998) and Bruni (2002) describe this as Pareto’s “method of analysis-synthesis”.  5
with economic facts.  The dualism between homo œconomicus and real man (that 
Pareto introduced in “Lasciate fare lasciate passare” (Pareto [1891] 1974)) is 
complement in the Cours with an additional dualism; namely the well-known 
distinction between ophelimity and utility.  Just as homo œconomicus abstracts from 
real man, economic ophelimity abstracts from economic utility, by removing the need 
to directly prospects from development and growth in material welfare from human 
conduct, and from utility in general, by removing the need to consider fluctuating 
influences on conduct and welfare from moral or ethical factors.  The pure economics 
of the Cours is deduced from the hedonistic postulate and on the assumption that 
homo œconomicus acts only in response to the force of ophelimity, where ophelimity 
is the pleasure derived from the relationship between man and things. 
To clarify the role of deduction in pure economic theory, Pareto introduces a dualistic 
distinction between the deductive method and the metaphysical method.  Both 
methods involve hypothetical deductions; the deductive method requires that 
deductions are considered with reference to observed fact, and the metaphysical 
method only requires that deductions derive from ‘principles’ without necessarily 
considering their relationship to fact (Pareto [1986-87] 1971, p635).  In regard to pure 
theory, Pareto rejects the metaphysical method and accepts the deductive method.
4 
However, contrary to contemporary classifications, the role of hypothetical deduction 
in the pure economics of the Cours does not extend to deductions derived from the 
system of equilibrium economics.  For example, deductions based on an application 
of general equilibrium theory have some practical relevance (eg. policy relevance to 
Government) and are considered an application of pure economics.  It is particularly 
relevant that the analysis in the Cours on matters that are now known as the first and 
second laws of welfare economics are included in the chapters on applied economics, 
not the section dealing with the principles of pure economics.  Consequently, 
mathematical economics should not be confused with pure economics in Pareto’s 
system.  While mathematical economics is theoretical, it concerns either pure theory 
or applied theory.  Similarly, institutional elements of theory, such as monetary theory 
and banking, typically considered today as pure theory, were also treated by Pareto as 
applied economics, probably because such factors are beyond the strict definition of 
the equilibrium system even when theoretical propositions are involved. 
The pure theory of the Cours is, therefore, concerned solely with static equilibrium 
and its characteristics.  Movement, be it virtual movement from an equilibrium point 
or real movement observed inductively, is treated in applied economics.  The scope of 
applied economics includes results with theoretical implications from deductions 
considering the impact of movements (with or without reference to social institutions) 
to empirical studies and historical studies of social selection and evolution.  To 
illustrate the broad scope of applied economics implied under the structure of the 
Cours, it is relevant that Pareto’s first major study in political sociology 
Les Systèmes socialists (Pareto [1901-02] 1974) was taught within the applied 
                                                 
4 Of course, given Pareto’s emphasis on the relationship between fact and theory, he emphasises that 
deductive studies and inductive studies in political economy must supplement each other (Pareto 1897).  
The importance of the deductive and inductive methods in light of Pareto’s contact with Giovanni 
Vailati is examined by Bruni (2002).  6
economics program at the University of Lausanne
5, with the most original theoretical 
contributions in this important work focussing on social selection and evolution.  
Economists have generally not appreciated the limited scope of Pareto’s pure 
economics and the broad scope of his applied economics, especially the proposition 
that applied theory is an aspect of applied economics.  For example, in his book the 
Economics of Vilfredo Pareto, Renato Cirillo laments that in the Cours, “out of about 
800 pages not more that 75 are concerned with pure theory.  The presentation is 
chaotic... and no one so far has given a satisfactory explanation as to why he calls the 
second part ‘applied economics’
6” (Cirillo 1979, pp.17-18).  In contrast to Cirillo, 
Pasquale Boninsegni, Pareto’s successor at the University of Lausanne, saw 
considerable merit in the differentiation between pure and applied economics outlined 
in the Cours, and tended to work within these distinctly Paretian bounds.
7 
Subsequent to the Cours, in the recently rediscovered “Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un 
nuovo trattato di economia pura del Prof Pareto” (Pareto [1900] 1982)
8, Pareto 
specified pure economics based on two different approaches; the deductive method of 
the  Cours and a new ‘choice’ approach developed from a dualism between the 
experimental notions of choice and obstacles to choice.  Importantly, the “Sunto” 
demonstrated that the same equilibrium result could be achieved by using either the 
deductive method employed in the Cours (provided that ophelimity is represented as a 
quantity that can be measured) or an alternative sequence which does not require the 
quantification of ophelimity, only the ordering of preferences.  The alternative 
methodological sequence in the “Sunto” involves three distinct stages: induction (to 
experimentally determined preference ordering of indifference curves); deduction (to 
establish equilibrium based on the relationship between preference ordering and 
obstacles associated with choice); and induction (to confirm equilibrium through 
observation of constant and repeat actions under given circumstances).  Subject to the 
principle phenomenon in economics being revealed by constant and repeated choice 
in unchanged circumstances, Pareto was able to use the dualism between choice and 
obstacles to choice to demonstrate the equivalence of pure economic theory deduced 
from: (i) a hypothetical postulate, involving a deductive-inductive methodological 
sequence utilised in the Cours; and (ii) inductively determined preferences, utilising 
the inductive-deductive-inductive methodological sequence employed in the “Sunto”.
9  
                                                 
5 Fiorenzo Mornati (1999) indicates in Pasquale Boninsegni e la Scuola di Losanna that Boninsegni 
(Pareto’s protégé at Lausanne) presented classes on Les Systèmes socialists as part of the applied 
economics program. 
6 The second book of the applied economic section is entitled “The economic organism”, which 
considers matters as diverse as the general principles of social evolution and the foundations of welfare 
economics. 
7 The influence of Pareto’s Cours on Boninsegni is considered in Pasquale Boninsegni e La Scuola di 
Losanna (Mornati 1999). 
8  The importance of the “Sunto” from economic and methodological perspectives is discussed in 
Georgescu-Roegen (1975) and more recently by Marchionatti and Gambino (1997) and Bruni and 
Guala (2001) and Bruni (2002). 
9  The author is indebted to Fiorenzo Mornati and Roberto Marchionatti for pointing out that Pareto’s  
“Considerazioni sui principii fondamentali dell’economia politica pure” (Pareto [1892-93] 1982) also 
accommodates an inductive-deductive-inductive methodological sequence.  In this regard, the sale of 
goods at various prices is an observed fact (induction), the theory of value is deduced from hypothetical 
postulate to explain these observed facts (deduction) and the deduced theoretical outcomes of value 
theory are then either discarded, accepted or modified depending on its concordance with observed 
evidence (induction).  However, a significant difference in the method of deduction employed in these 
two works remains, with the “Considerzioni sui …” presenting theoretical deductions from a  7
While Pareto regarded the specification of equilibrium theory in terms of choice as 
the more scientific of the two approaches, Pareto continued to employ the deductive 
method when considering virtual movements away from equilibrium states (McLure 
2003).  Consequently, given the division between pure and applied economics 
outlined in the Cours, deductions from an hypothetical postulate continued as an 
important mode of enquiry in applied economics. 
The choice and obstacle dualism in the “Sunto” is modified slightly in the Manuale di 
economia politica (Pareto [1906] 1974), where general equilibrium is recast as a 
system of opposing forces associated with tastes and obstacles.  Like the balance 
between choice and obstacles, the greater level of theoretical generalisation in the 
Manuale complements Pareto’s use of the mechanical analogy, as general equilibrium 
is primarily considered in terms of a balance between two opposing forces, whereas in 
the  Cours, exposition places more emphasis on the separate study of exchange, 
production and capitalisation.
10  The Manuale is also important for further clarifying 
the limits of pure economics, by suggesting that pure equilibrium economics only 
deals with logical and repeat actions to procure goods and satisfy tastes under the 
condition that the subjective fact ‘conforms perfectly’ with the objective fact (Pareto 
[1906] 1974, p.105).  The significance of this ‘perfect confirmation’ is considered 
further in Sections 4 and 5. 
4) Objective-Subjective Form and Intrinsic-Extrinsic Elements of Theory 
To treat social equilibrium within a general theoretical framework, as opposed to the 
applied framework of the Cours, Pareto progressively modified his methodology by 
de-emphasising the association between pure theory and hypothetical deduction.  The 
demonstration in the “Sunto” that pure theory deduced from inductive data is 
equivalent to pure theory deduced a hypothetical postulate was the first major 
methodological step towards accommodating social phenomena within a general 
theoretical context.  The next major step came with Pareto’s recognition that the 
inductive-deductive-inductive methodological sequence provides a mechanism for 
treating social change within a general theoretical framework even when deduction 
from hypothetical postulate is unable to identify social laws that accord with fact.  To 
arrive at this position, Pareto again employed dualistic distinctions, and the concepts 
associated with these distinctions, to emphasise a relativistic approach to science.  
Pareto’s investigation of the constraints on pure theory associated with subjective and 
objective purpose proved to be a crucial dualism, as it ultimately lead to Pareto’s 
unique bi-lateral distinction between logical and non-logical aspects of conduct.  The 
importance of the objective-subjective dualism for sociology was first notable in his 
1900 “Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche”: 
“…each sociological phenomenon has two distinct, and often diverse, 
forms.  They are an objective form, which determines the relation between 
real objects, and a subjective form, which establishes the relationship 
                                                                                                                                            
hypothetical postulate and the “Sunto” presenting theoretical deductions as deriving from observed 
preferences. This difference is important to the evolution of Pareto’s approach to economic and social 
equilibrium. 
10 Amoroso (1949) reconciles the three sets of equations for general equilibrium in the Cours with the 
two sets of equilibrium equations for tastes and obstacles in the Manuale.  8
between psychological states.  … it is not enough to research the 
correspondence between the two phenomena, we are presented with a 
third problem, that is to understand how real phenomenon act to alter the 
subjective phenomenon and vice-versa” (Pareto [1900] 1980 p.181). 
The dualistic objective-subjective distinction 
11 is important here because it marks an 
explicit recognition of the ongoing interdependence between the subjective and 
objective forms.  Not only may subjective intent lead to conduct and an objective 
relationship, but observation of a change in an objective relationship may also 
influence subjective intent, which impacts upon subsequent action.  This issue is of 
relevance to contemporary welfare economics, as when preferences are ordered (or 
utility measured) with respect to subjective phenomena, ongoing interaction between 
subjective and objective phenomena equates to interdependence between conduct and 
preferences, or endogenous preferences. 
Interdependence, and a lack of interdependence, between the subjective and objective 
is also the basis of Pareto’s distinction between non-logical and logical conduct.   
Pareto first raises the distinction between logical and non-logical action in a letter to 
Maffeo Pantaleoni in 1897 (Pareto 1960 vol 2, p.73).  However, the distinction was 
not defined, and non-logical action was simply associated with influences on social 
phenomena that have little or nothing to do with reason.  In published work, the 
distinction is raised in the “Sunto”, but again it is only to note that homo œconomicus 
undertakes logical action, not non-logical action (Pareto [1900] 1982, p.375-76).  In 
“Sul fenomeno economico” (Pareto [1900] 1999) the phrase non-logical action is 
again used, this time to acknowledge that non-logical factors influence economic 
choices and reiterate that such influences are beyond the scope of pure economics.  
Logical and non-logical distinction was subsequently raised in many other 
publications.  Important among these is the discussion of the relationship between 
logic and objective and subjective connections between things in “Programma e sunto 
di un corso di sociologia” (Pareto [1905] 1980, pp302-03) and the general discussion 
in the opening chapters of the Mauale di econmia politica (Pareto [1906] 1974). 
However, the clearest definition of non-logical action, which was first provided in “Le 
Azioni non logiche” (Pareto [1910] 1980), derives directly from the dualistic 
objective-subjective distinction.  Logical action must not only logically connect means 
to ends, but also the subjective end of action must be identical to the objective end.   
When experimental observation confirms that the subject and objective forms 
conform perfectly (through constant and repeat action in unchanged circumstances) 
subjective preferences are unaffected by objective phenomena and such conduct is 
classed as logical.  Conversely, when the objective path intended to connect means to 
ends causes a divergence between the subjective and objective ends, subjective intent 
and objective end alter with conduct, and such action is non-logical.
12   W h e n  
experimental observation establishes that, when circumstances are unchanged and 
                                                 
11  Also referred to as a dualism between psychic states (or things A) and physical states (or things B) 
in “Il metodo della sociologia” (Pareto[1906] 1980, p.284-85).  In the subsequent “L’economia e la 
sociologia dal punto di vista scientifico” the same issue is raised but in the context of the ‘two aspects’ 
from which facts should be studied, namely the study of: 1) facts in themselves; and 2) the received 
impression of facts across people  (Pareto [1907] 1980 p.342). 
12 Other forms of non-logical contact identified by Pareto, but largely dismissed as unimportant (in 
terms of the relationship between fact and theory) include: action without subjective intent; and purely 
instinctive action or conduct without reason.  9
action is not constant and repeated, subjective preferences do not conform perfectly 
with objective phenomena and conduct is classed as non-logical. 
The final major methodological change that permitted the development of sociology 
as general theory of social equilibrium based on endogenous preferences was the 
explicit acknowledgement of intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of theory.  As noted in 
Section 2, the intrinsic aspects of theory concern the soundness of theory in terms of 
its relationship to facts while the extrinsic concern the relationship between a theory 
and component members of the general community without regard to the theory’s 
intrinsic merit.  From the perspective of social science, Pareto argued that “Both 
methods, if used exclusively, are equally incomplete.” (Pareto [1916] 1935, 
pp.503-04). 
The crucial aspect of this dualism for Pareto’s methodology is that social theories and 
doctrines came to represent the initial data from which a general theory of social 
equilibrium could be developed, with analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of 
theories providing the instrument through which regularities associated with the 
ongoing interdependence between objective and subjective phenomena are analysed. 
Bruni (2002, p.40-41) demonstrates that Pareto’s concern with isolating two 
perspectives on theory dates back at least to 1898, citing a comment by Maffeo 
Pantaleoni that Pareto considers theories both intrinsically and in regard to those who 
create it and welcome it.  The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is also implicit in the 
Les Systèmes socialists (Pareto [1901-02] 1974), where theories of scientific socialism 
(eg. Marxism) are differentiated from religious socialism (e.g. religious doctrines) and 
also metaphysical socialism (e.g. utopian visions of ethical socialism).  However, the 
relevance of this relationship to the development of general theory was not evident to 
Pareto at that stage, with the original work in the Systèmes focussing on inductive 
laws associated with imperfect social evolution.  It was not until the Trattato that 
observable data on the relationship between the extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of 
theories and doctrines were treated as primary data on the interdependence between 
subjective and objective phenomena, from which general theory of social equilibrium 
could be deduced and then subject to verification. 
Consequently, even though ongoing interaction between subjective and objective 
phenomena prevented the derivation of general social equilibrium theory from 
hypothetical deduction based on behavioural postulates, Pareto was able to utilise the 
inductive-deductive-inductive approach to science that first appeared in the “Sunto” to 
shift the focus of scientific treatment of social equilibrium from applied economics to 
general social theory.  Specifically, theories and doctrines were subject to inductive 
categorisation and description, general sociological theory was established by 
deduction (in large part based on observed regularities associated with the extrinsic 
and intrinsic aspects of theories and doctrines) and finally both inductive 
categorisation of social phenomena from theories and doctrines and deduced theory 
were verified by inductive analysis of historical experience.  The theoretical 
instruments for the study of social equilibrium developed in this manner are briefly 
discussed in Section 6. 
Another, and also important, aspect of the intrinsic-extrinsic dualism is that it 
qualifies the fact-theory dualism (as outlined in Section 3, where fact is regarded as an 
independent point of reference for theories).  As the subjective forms of theory have  10
extrinsic consequences that alter human conduct through interaction between 
subjective and objective phenomena, theories and doctrines, and their impact on 
conduct, become social facts that must be treated in general sociology. 
The subjective-objective and intrinsic–extrinsic dualisms also combine to clarify the 
relativistic aspects of Pareto’s approach to science.  This is perhaps not surprising as a 
dualistic distinction is, in itself, a relative instrument, with each element of the 
dualism contrasting with the other.  In the Trattato, the dualistic subjective-objective 
distinction is clarified with the acknowledgement that all knowledge is really 
subjective, except that objective knowledge has, in relative terms, a low level of 
subjectivity (Pareto [1916] 1935, pp.76-77).  In this way, it is possible to consider the 
progress of scientific knowledge, where the current level of ‘objective’ knowledge is 
a benchmark or reference point for assessing scientific progress over history.  Pareto 
also recognised that knowledge from experimental observations is constrained to the 
“limits of time and space known to us” (Pareto [1916] 1935, p. 51). 
To emphasise the relativistic limits of scientific knowledge which dualisms helped 
create, Pareto (in the ‘index-summary of theorems included at the end of the Trattato) 
set out a detailed and extensive dualistic comparison of logico-experimental and non-
logico-experimental theories.  He concluded that: 
“Practitioners of the non-logical sciences do not as a rule grasp the 
relative, contingent character of the logical sciences and speak of them as 
though they did envisage some “absolute”…They therefore imagine that 
the logico-experimental sciences have dogmas, such as …the dogma that 
the theorems of logico-experimental sciences yield a “certainty” that gives 
us knowledge of “laws” and not merely experimental uniformities” 
(Pareto [1916] 1935, p. 1924-25). 
Logico-experimental science does not deal in certainties because experimental 
uniformities are assessments made in relation to principal phenomena (as outlined in 
the  Cours), and ‘interferences’ between laws for related principal phenomena 
influence objective facts.  To manage the impact in interferences between social laws, 
Pareto introduced a dualism between general and special sociology,
13 where the 
Trattato is a general sociology that analytically and synthetically investigates the 
general forms of society and special sociology considers the particular forms of 
various social phenomena.  However, the management of interferences between social 
laws for various primary social phenomena is achieved synthetically not analytically, 
with Pareto introducing the dualistic absolute-relative distinction to clarify that “the 
absolute has no place in logico-experimental science, and we must always take in a 
relative sense propositions that in the dress of ordinary parlance seem absolute” 
(Pareto [1916] 1935 p.57).
14 
While the role of subjectivity in Paretian relativism provides for progress in scientific 
knowledge to be considered, it denies the possibility of assessing progress in 
subjective knowledge.  However, subjective knowledge associated with social 
                                                 
13 Which itself has routes in the Paretian distinction between ‘la forma’ (form) and ‘il fondo’ 
(foundation, or substance) of sentiments introduced in the Systèmes ([1901-2] 1974 pp.229-30). 
14 On the same issue, Pareto then goes on to note: “that much being clearly grasped, any 
misunderstanding is impossible, whereas to express ourselves with absolute exactness would be to 
wallow in lengthy verbosities as useless as they would be pedantic.” (Pareto [1916] 1935 p.57)  11
theories and political manifestoes can have extrinsic (positive or negative) benefits to 
society, or sub-sets of society, and the extrinsic merits of subjective ideas for society 
can be considered by logico-experimental sciences, although only within the 
relativistic limits of the aspect of utility, which is discussed in Section 5.   
5)  The Aspect of Utility and Relativism 
The dualistic distinction between ophelimity and utility has been considered 
extensively in the historical and secondary Paretian literatures.
15  However, the 
relativistic context of the aspect of utility has not been considered in light of the 
discussion in Section 4. 
Ophelimity in its economic context is pleasure (in the Cours) or the less hedonistic 
notion of tastes (in the Manuale).  The important feature of ophelimity for the 
purposes of this study is that it is a yardstick for representing the relationship between 
man and things (economic goods), but only when the objective end of action 
conforms perfectly with the subjective end.  In contrast, utility refers to the benefit 
from conduct when subjective intent is interdependent with objective action, 
suggesting that utility, or preferences, are modified with conduct.  It is therefore ironic 
that, unlike Pareto’s contribution to the theoretical study of economic equilibrium 
derived from the concept of ophelimity, the importance of his general sociological 
theory of social equilibrium, especially its relevance to welfare studies based on 
endogenous preferences, is still largely unrecognised by historians of economic 
thought. 
Welfare propositions associated with maximising ophelimity and maximising utility 
are very different in Pareto’s system of analysis.  The well known proposition that 
free competition is Pareto optimal is, within Pareto’s work, confined to the context of 
ophelimity.  In the Trattato, this situation is characterised in reference to a dualistic 
distinction between the maximum of ophelimity for the community and the maximum 
of ophelimity of each individual in the community, with Pareto’s analysis 
demonstrating that these two maxima correspond (ie. for the community and the 
individual) at a point of competitive equilibrium.  However, Pareto also utilised a 
dualistic distinction between the maximum of utility for the community and the 
maximum of utility of the community.  In both instances, each individual is assumed to 
weight their utility from their own conduct as well as from the conduct of other 
members of society (individual’s social preferences).  To maximise utility from the 
perspective of the collective, Government’s can identify and weight individuals’ 
social preferences and either maximise utility for the community (by introducing 
policies that maximise welfare subject to the constraint that no one is harmed) or 
maximise  utility of the community (by introducing policies that maximise welfare 
without the constraint that no one is harmed). 
Importantly, instead of considering utility as a relationship between a person and 
things, which is the case when ophelimity is considered, utility primarily depends on 
individuals’ propensity to observe or violate precepts prevailing in society (Pareto 
                                                 
15  Including Fisher [1896](1999), Spirito (1978), Hutcheson (1953), Tarascio (1968), Freund (1994), 
McLure (2001) Bruni (2002).  12
[1916] 1935 p.1473-4)
16.  This allows social equilibrium to be considered with respect 
to the relationship between conduct and social norms, and directly links utility with 
Pareto’s notion of residues (which are discussed in Section 6).  When an individual’s 
personality is such that their utility is greatest when he or she acts outside of 
prevailing social norms, then under Pareto’s approach, the individual will act in a 
non-conformist manner, at least to the extent permitted in the presence of (generally 
social) obstacles to such conduct.  Conversely, when an individual’s personality 
dictates that their utility is greatest when he or she acts within the prevailing social 
norms, then the individual will act in a conformist manner, at least to the extent 
permitted by (generally social) obstacles to such conduct. 
By specifying social equilibrium at this general level, which clearly lacks the precise 
determinism of pure economics, Pareto was able to undertake analysis which 
accounted for the impact of ongoing interaction between subjective and objective 
phenomena without resorting to false determinism.  In this regard, utility varies with 
the degree of conformity and non-conformity of individuals’ conduct, not the 
particular form of the (potentially infinite) variations in the types of non-conformist 
conduct.
17  If utility were to be considered in unique relation to each particular form 
of conduct, a false determinism would re-emerge that would be analogous to the 
misspecification of economic equilibrium based on exogenous preferences when 
experimental observation confirms that preferences should be treated as endogenous. 
Pareto’s different approach to welfare in economics and sociology also has very 
important implications for his relativistic approach to science.  Statements about 
welfare deduced from pure economic theory are essentially unconstrained because 
people and their tastes for things are represented, through the notion of ophelimity, as 
stable and unchanging over time.
18  In contrast, statements about welfare deduced 
from general sociology are only valid when considered relative to prevailing social 
precepts when such precepts endure.  When social change associated with ongoing 
interdependence between the objective and subjective phenomena causes social 
precepts to alter, the implied unit in which utility is measures also alters.   
                                                 
16 Although it must be acknowledged that in “Il massimo di utilità per una collettività in sociologia” 
(Pareto [1913] 1980), written 3 years before the Trattato was published, this distinction (whereby 
ophelimity focuses on the relationship between people and things and utility focuses on the relationship 
between behaviour and prevailing social precepts) was not explicit.  Aspects of the distinction are 
implied in the discussion of welfare and crime and punishment, but the association between utility and 
conduct was not directly considered.  However, this article concludes by noting that the analysis was 
aimed “at taking the first step in the theory of social utility” (Pareto [1913] 1980, p.605).  Subsequent 
steps, especially the explicit treatment of utility as a relationship between behaviour and its variation 
from prevailing social precepts, were taken in the examination of social equilibrium in Trattato. 
17 Nevertheless, it should not be inferred that Pareto’s notion of utility is unrelated to the benefits 
associated with the relationship between people and things, as this is an aspect to the broader 
relationship between individual conduct, group conduct and normal social precepts.  For example, the 
creation and distribution of economic goods is influenced by social norms, as well as variations in 
conduct around these norms by members of the community.  Pareto, to some extent, even analysed the 
link between conduct and things through the use of the rentier-speculator and fox-lion dualisms, which 
are briefly discussed in Section 6.   
18 The only constraint is practical, as the notion of ophelimity is generally limited to circumstances 
where there is no interaction between the objective and subjective phenomena, or where such 
interaction is modest and does not prevent the pure economic theory from being a good ‘first 
approximation’ to equilibrium.  13
Consequently, utility as a quantity is specific at a given state and time, and 
conclusions on the maximisation of welfare in sociology are limited to circumstances 
where social equilibrium at this state and time is stable (or when any change in the 
form of social equilibrium has no impact on prevailing social precepts).  When 
ongoing interdependence between subjective and objective phenomena alters 
prevailing social precepts, utility alters and is incapable of indicating whether action 
is welfare enhancing or welfare diminishing.  For example the aspect of utility in 
Pareto’s scheme could not be analysed to indicate whether a change in the degree of 
social centralisation (and the consequent change in both social precepts and the degree 
of conformity with altered precepts) would enhance or diminish welfare. 
Fundamentally, the variability associated with the aspect of utility is likely to become 
greater over time, thereby ruling out any possibility that analysis of utility would 
provide a basis for making judgements on social progress.  As purely subjective 
judgements do not constitute logico-experimental findings (as there are no criteria by 
which progress in subjective knowledge can be assessed), only partial indicators of 
progress are available from objective phenomena.  For example, within the Paretian 
system, it is possible to examine changes in the standards of living and productive 
capacity over time (Pareto [1916] 1935, p.1578), as these are essentially observable.  
However, it would be illegitimate to equate such observations with social progress, as 
that would rely on either: a subjective presumption that material progress is the same 
as social progress; or use of the aspect of utility in a manner that exceeds its scientific 
limitations. 
6) General Theory of Social Equilibrium 
Concurrent with the methodological modifications reviewed in Section 4 to 
accommodate broad social phenomena within a general theoretical framework, Pareto 
progressively created his general theory of social equilibrium, an original and 
watershed development relative to his treatment of social equilibrium within the 
Cours as applied economics.  In this Section, Pareto’s progress from economics to 
sociology is not charted per sé, as such research has already been published.
19   
Instead, the role of dualisms in the development of Pareto’s general theory of social 
equilibrium is reviewed. 
Pareto’s general theory of social equilibrium only fully emerges in the Trattato.  It is 
based on four analytical elements: interests; elites; residues; and derivations, with 
social equilibrium considered synthetically based on the interaction between each of 
these elements.  The primary goals of the general sociology are to consider the 
stability and instability of social equilibrium and consequent implications for social 
movement. 
The interests and elites elements of social equilibrium predate Pareto’s work on the 
intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of theories. Interests concern the impact of material 
interest on social phenomena, and elites concerns the interaction between elite and 
non-elite elements of economic and other, mainly political, social groups.  Both these 
elements have their origins in economics.  ‘Interests’ is essentially another term for 
the subject of pure and applied economics.  Elite conduct derives from the applied 
                                                 
19 See for example Busino 1989 (pp.363-84).  14
study of evolution and social selection in Pareto’s applied economics, commencing in 
the Cours and culminating in the Systèmes, where interaction between political and 
economic elites is correlated with what Pareto calls public ‘spoliation’ (destruction of 
collective wealth as a consequence of alignments between economic and political 
elites to appropriate property of non-elites and sometimes competing elites). 
Pareto illustrated the interaction between interests and elites in 1911 in “Redditieri e 
speculatori”, which introduces the dualistic rentiers-speculators distinction. 
“From an abstract and scientific point of view, one can distinguish ‘the 
saver’, who lives solely on the interest from his savings, and the 
‘entrepreneur’, who offers the services of savings and other forms of 
capital … From a concrete point of view, we must instead consider two 
types…The first category [rentier] is largely conservative, hostile to 
change, a little fearful, patriotic and nationalistic.  The second category 
[speculators] is, to the contrary, innovative and, above all, sniffs out 
opportunities to realise good returns” (Pareto [1911] 1980, p.416). 
In contrasting the saver and entrepreneur from the abstract and scientific point of view 
with the rentier and speculator from the concrete point of view, Pareto was laying the 
foundation for focusing on conduct and behaviour as a basis for examining interaction 
between objective and subjective phenomena.  In this regard, the speculator-rentier 
dualism contrasts conservative and innovative attributes of economic actors in all 
spheres, not simply those who receive unearned income or seek rents, to provide a 
behavioural dimension to the study of concrete economic phenomenon that is not 
evident from pure theory.  As such, the speculator-rentier eventually becomes a 
useful analogy for illustrating the psychological basis for the residues-derivations 
dualism, and its impact on social equilibrium. 
The dualistic residues-derivations distinction derives directly from the study and 
classification of the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of written social theories and 
doctrines.  Derivations concerns the general uniformities observable from written 
theoretical rationalisations that derive from subjective propositions,
20 and residues 
concern regularities associated with the residua of subjective element of theories that 
are included explicitly or implicitly in theories, but not necessarily included in the 
quasi-rationalisation of subjective propositions. 
As derivations take many different forms, they are a variable aspect of non-logic that 
is evident from the variety of rationalisations in theories.  In contrast, residues are the 
constant element evident from implicit and explicit sentimental aspects of written 
theories.  From this finding, Pareto hypothesises that the regularities evident with 
residues and derivations established from observations of written theory can also be 
observed in human behaviour.  That is, residues also act as a constant force on human 
conduct and derivations act as a variable force on human conduct. 
Pareto’s classification of residues, based on an examination of the intrinsic and 
extrinsic aspects of theories, yielded six classes of residues.  However, in developing 
                                                 
20 As noted by Busino (1989, p.372), the 1900 “Un’appicazione di teorie sociologiche” marks Pareto’s 
first published recognition that man takes pleasure in explaining his actions with principles and, after 
the event, imagining that he has justified those actions (Pareto [1990] 1982, p.179).  15
his general theory of social equilibrium, only a dual classification of residues was 
used, Class I residues – instinct for combinations and Class II residues – persistence 
of aggregates.
21.  A person with a dominant propensity to seek a change to the 
prevailing combinations of relationships between people, ideas, and things is classed 
as a person with a relative dominance of Class I residues.   In contrast, a person with a 
dominant propensity to preserve prevailing relationships between people, ideas and 
things is classed as a person with a relative dominance in Class II residues. 
Dualistic subclasses are also introduced within the main classes of residues and 
derivations.  In regard to Class I residues, combinations apply between similars and 
opposites (likeness and opposites, unusual things and exceptional occurrences, 
association of felicitous state with good and infelicitous state with bad).  Class II 
residues are, in part, subdivided into a contrast between the persistence of relations 
between a person and other people, people and places, the living and the dead, and the 
dead and the belongings of the dead.  Dualisms are also used for didactic and 
definitional reasons when derivations are considered.  For example, dualistic 
distinctions are introduced for derivations-facts,  derivations-sentiments; 
derivations-metaphysical entities; derivations-supernatural entities and derivations-
reality as a means of clarifying, and indirectly defining, the sociological meaning of 
the term derivations.  To further illustrate the characteristics of derivations Pareto 
used a range of dualisms, some of which are shown in the Table 1 of the Appendix. 
Pareto’s earlier rentier-speculator distinction is introduced in the Trattato as a means 
of explaining the synthetic union of Class I and Class II residues with interests, elites, 
and derivations in heterogenous collectives.  This is because the personality profiles 
associated with individuals rich in Class I residues and Class II residues complement 
the  speculators-rentiers dualism, and illustrates the interaction between his four 
theoretical aspects that are united synthetically to determine whether social 
equilibrium is stable or unstable.  The illustration of the general theoretical syntheses 
is given further depth by introducing a fox-lion dualism for political elites; with the 
indirect and cunning action associated with foxes and direct and forceful action 
associated with lions. 
In the 1922 Trasformazione della democrazia Pareto clarifies a key objective of the 
synthetic theory of social equilibrium by introducing a dualistic distinction between 
state’s rights and individual’s rights (Pareto [1921] 1982, p.926).  When this is 
recognised, the fours elements of Pareto general sociology interact to create a (stable 
or unstable) balance between dual and opposing forces, namely the centripetal forces 
(to increase the central authority in the State) and centrifugal forces (to increase the 
authority of decentralised groups and individuals).  The general theory of social 
equilibrium may therefore be presented as: (i) specific analysis of interests, elites, 
residues and derivations to isolate the centripetal and centrifugal forces in society, and 
(ii) synthetic unification of these analyses to establish whether the net impact of these 
forces is to stabilise or de-stabilise the prevailing equilibrium between state and 
individual authority, and the related matter of any consequent variation in the form of 
stable or unstable social equilibrium. 
                                                 
21 However, many attributes of the remaining classes of residues can be derived when utility profiles of 
people dominated by Class I and Class II residues are defined and preferences for individual’s rights 
and states’ rights considered (see McLure 2001).   16
Two consequences of Pareto’s reliance on dualistic distinctions in the development of 
the analytics of the general sociology and the general synthesis of these analytics to 
consider social equilibrium are: (i) a perception that phenomena, and aspects of the 
analytics of phenomena, constitute a balance of opposing forces; and (ii) a focus on 
crude ‘proportions’ to explain phenomena.  The first point is supported by the 
dualisms cited in Table 2 in the Appendix, where the notion of balance in economic 
and social phenomena is implied in both the science (the analysis and the synthesis) 
and the description of economic and social phenomena that illustrate the relevance of 
the science.  The second point is supported by the fact that, even though Pareto 
recognised that people’s attributes vary by degree, which suggests that the full 
distribution of behavioural attributes are relevant influences on social equilibrium, he 
tended to group individuals into a series of contrasting dualistic categories (elites and 
non-elites, people rich in Class I resides and people rich in Class II residues, 
speculators and rentiers or foxes and lions).  Pareto even concludes, in the main 
theorem at the end of the Trattato, that proportions derived from the dualisms on 
Class I-Class II residues and elites-non-elites (ie. ruling and subject classes) have 
enough explanatory power to be the main focus of studies into social equilibrium and 
the development of social forms.   
“Among the many, many elements that have a bearing on social forms and 
on the development on those forms in history, evidently outstanding are 
the relative proportions in which residues are found to be functioning in 
the various social strata and especially the proportions of Class I and Class 
II residues in the ruling and subject classes respectively.  History shows 
that a first rough outline of developments may be obtained by centering 
the main attention on those propositions, other circumstances of 
importance being considered subordinate to them” (Pareto [1916] 1935, 
p.1921). 
7) Conclusion 
In his letter to Benedetto Croce published in the Giornale degli Econmisti in 1900, 
Pareto noted that “from the large slice that you have cut off the concrete phenomenon, 
I have cut off yet a smaller slice which I mean to study” (Pareto [1900] 1982, 
p.225)
22.   At the time he wrote this comment, dualisms were primarily a mechanism 
for reducing the concrete phenomenon to a form that could be studied in pure theory 
based on an inductive-deductive-inductive methodological sequence when equivalent 
results in pure theory could be derived from the deductive method.  Also at that time, 
Pareto regarded ongoing interaction between the subjective and objective form of 
society as an aspect of applied economics (which included the study of evolution and 
social selection) and not general sociological theory.   
However, over the period between 1900 and 1916, dualisms were not only used to 
examine small slices of the concrete phenomenon, but also used to section new and 
larger slices of the concrete phenomena.  This involved the adoption of the 
inductive-deductive-inductive methodological sequence, when the deductive method 
fails to achieve outcomes that accord with observed fact, to investigate the 
implications of the interaction between subjective  and objective phenomena, and 
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relying on regularities associated with the dualistic intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to 
develop a general theoretical framework for sociology. 
The theory that developed within this new framework utilised dualisms in a number 
of ways.  These include the classification of primary research data, the development 
of basic theoretical elements and illustration of these theoretical elements, such as the 
importance of equilibrium as a stable or unstable balance between opposing forces.  A 
likely consequence of the use of dualisms to expand the scope of general theory was 
an increasing role assigned to relativism, with the aspect of utility contingent on the 
prevailing social precepts.  Other important consequences of Pareto’s reliance on 
dualisms is that they enabled him to highlight the role of balance in economic and 
social phenomena and to simplify analysis-synthesis by representing various 
proportions as indicators with a very significant explanatory power on the issue of 
social equilibrium. 
Therefore, it is concluded that Pareto’s unique and important contributions to 
equilibrium theory were made possible by his capacity to employ a succession of 
sometimes related and often distinct dualisms.  Indeed, it could well be suggested that 
Pareto’s own mode of thinking on economic and social matters was characterised by 
successive dualistic contrasts. 
Attachment 
Table 1: Examples of Dualisms that Illustrate Theoretical Elements  
Dualisms   Theoretical Element  Aspect of theoretical Element 
illustrated 
Ophelimity and utility  Economics  Limits of economic man 
Homo œconomicus and real man  Economics  Limits of economic man 
Elites and non-elites  Applied economics and 
later, General Sociology 
The heterogeneous nature of the 
populations and authority of the 
few relative to the many 
Residues and derivations  Elements of Social 
Equilibrium 
Theoretical expression of the 
subjective phenomenon and 
interaction between the subjective 
and objective 
Class I and Class II  Residues  Two fundamental classification of 
subjective influences 
Intensity and variations   Derivations  Interaction between residues 
(intensity)and derivations 
(variations) on conduct. 
Voltaire and Lucian  Derivations  That theories of equal literary and 
logical effectiveness may receive 
different receptions form the 
community, suggesting that 
derivations derive from residues 
and not the other way around. 
Justice and truth  Derivations  How terms are associated in 
people’s minds with sentiments. 
Virtue and happiness   Derivations  The association of virtue with 
happiness in derivations, even 
when the terms are vague. 
The Popes and the Franciscans  Derivations  The interaction between Class 1 
and Class 2 residues in 
derivations.  18
Faith and reason  Derivations  That sentiment is common to 
different faiths when reasoning 
about the forms of competing 
religion suggests great differences 
between faiths. 
Catholicism and nationalism  Derivations  To demonstrate the varying forms 
of competing religions. 
Humanitarianism and socialism  Derivations  To demonstrate the varying forms 
of competing religions. 
The Keiser and the ‘will of the 
people’ 
Derivations  The use of derivations in politics 
that apply abstract meaning to the 




Table 2: Dualisms that infer ‘balance’ between Opposing Forces.  
Dualism   Initial Published Source  
Choice and obstacles  “Sunto” 
Tastes and obstacles  Manuale  
Savers and entrepreneurs  Redditieri e Speculatori (but implicit in the Cours) 
Rentiers and speculators  Redditieri e Speculatori 
Elites and non-elites  Systèmes 
Justice and compassion  Systèmes 
Reason and interests  Systèmes 
Reason and sentiment  Systèmes 
Benevolence (of the strong) and cowardice (of 
the weak) 
Systèmes 
Foxes and lions Trattato 
Residues and derivations Trattato 
Class I and Class 11 residues  Trattato 
Force and consent  Trattato 
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